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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What type of duty, if any, should land possessors owe to honey 
bees foraging on their property during pesticide applications?  
Generally, land possessors have not been held liable for damage to 
bees caused by pesticides sprayed on their own property.1  
However, in a significant deviation from the general rule regarding 
a landowner’s duty, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined in 
Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources2 that land possessors 
who have knowledge of foraging honey bees on the property owe 
the bees a common law duty of reasonable care.3 
Although both honey bees and pesticides play an important 
role in the agricultural economy of the United States, the two are 
not cooperative in their efforts.4  The question of liability for 
damages to honey bees has often been addressed in the context of 
pesticides drifting from a landowner’s property to a beekeeper’s 
property.5  However, the question of whether or not there should 
be a duty to protect foraging bees on a land possessor’s own 
property is a unique question6 and was one of first impression in 
Minnesota.7 
This Case Note examines Anderson’s decision and its possible 
effect on land-possessor liability to beekeepers in Minnesota and 
other jurisdictions.8  First, the Case Note presents the history of 
both pesticides and honey bees in the United States.9  Evaluating 
the history of each subject and the effect they have upon each 
other and the overall economy is crucial to understanding the 
balancing acts that courts should follow when confronted with 
 
 1. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 2. 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005). 
 3. Id. at 187; see infra Part V.B.3. 
 4. See infra Parts II.A, III.A-B., III.C.1. 
 5. See infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See infra Part IV.A-C. 
 7. See infra Part V.B. 
 8. See infra Parts V-VII. 
 9. See infra Parts II-III. 
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cases similar to Anderson. 
Next, the Case Note discusses the legal history of pesticide 
liability as it relates to honey bees and the evolution of such liability 
in Minnesota and other jurisdictions.10  Thus far, jurisdictions have 
varied extensively in the manner in which they have dealt with 
pesticide litigation.11  This is due, at least partially, to the variety of 
ways in which pesticides are both used and applied.12 
This Case Note then includes a detailed summary of the facts, 
procedural history, and decision of the Anderson case.13  Finally, this 
Case Note concludes with an analysis of the Anderson decision and 
its probable implications to future litigation in this arena and, most 
importantly, to pesticide users and beekeepers.14 
II.  THE HISTORY OF PESTICIDES 
A.  The Use, Growth, and Benefits of Pesticides 
All living things, including human beings, are limited in their 
growth by the availability of life-sustaining resources.15  Therefore, 
it is important for humans to use their natural resources 
efficiently.16  There are many ways to conduct efficient resource 
use, but pesticide17 usage is one proven route for the United 
States.18  Without pesticides, the United States would be unable to 
find a way to maintain its plentiful food supply and relatively high 
standard of living.19 
Pesticide use dates back as far as Ancient Rome, when insects 
were killed by burning sulfur and weeds were controlled with salt 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See discussion infra Parts III.C.1, IV. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See infra Parts VI-VII. 
 15. See KEITH S. DELAPLANE, PESTICIDE USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, 
BENEFITS, RISKS, AND TRENDS 1 (2000), http://pubs.caes.uga.edu/caespubs/pubs/ 
PDF/B1121.pdf. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Pesticides are any “substance or mixture of substances intended for: 
preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest.”  U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, About Pesticides, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/about/ (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2006).  “Pests are living organisms that occur where they are not 
wanted or that cause damage to crops or humans or other animals.”  Id.  Examples 
of pests include insects, mice or rats, weeds, fungi, and bacteria.  Id. 
 18. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 1. 
 19. Id. 
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concoctions.20  By the late nineteenth century, U.S. farmers were 
attempting to control pests through various primitive means.21  
There were at least two major problems with early versions of 
pesticides.  The first was that the active ingredients, such as arsenic, 
were highly toxic.22  Thus, exposure through application or by 
eating foods containing pesticide residue could be deadly.23  A 
second problem was that most suppliers were marketing pesticides 
that did not work as promised, thus frustrating farmers who paid 
substantial money with the hopes of having pest-free fields.24 
Pesticide use during the 1940s and 1950s dramatically 
increased, partially due to the attention created by World War II 
soldiers falling victim to a range of pest-borne diseases.25  The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) promoted the widespread 
spraying of Dichloro-Diphenyl-Trichloroethane (DDT) to kill pests 
carrying diseases, including mosquitoes that could transfer 
malaria.26  Today, the beneficial effects of pesticides are evidenced 
in developed countries by the control of tick and insect-borne 
diseases, such as yellow fever, typhoid, and malaria, and the 
sanitation of people’s homes.27 
The attention given to pesticides during and after World War 
II resulted in scientific developments making agricultural use of 
pesticides more feasible.  Today, in poor and undeveloped 
countries, 95% of the population works to produce the food 
supply, but in developed countries such as the United States only 3 
to 5% of the population is involved in food production.28  The 
difference between the percentages is the efficiency created by 
 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. Id.  Farmers were often unsuccessful in controlling pests in their crop 
fields by way of copper acetoarsenite, calcium arsenate, nicotine sulfate, and 
sulfur.  Id. 
 22. See Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, & 
Public Health: Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 4-5 (2002). 
 23. Id. at 5. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 6-7. 
 26. Id. at 7-8.  DDT was banned by the Environmental Protection Agency in 
1972 for virtually all but emergency uses in the United States because of its 
environmental persistence and food chain accumulation.  U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Terms of Environment,  http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/ 
dterms.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 27. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 4. 
 28. Id. 
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pesticide use in food production.29 
As of 2000, pesticides were used on approximately 900,000 
farms and in seventy million households.30  One study found that 
85% of U.S. homes contained at least one pesticide.31  With 
increasing populations, the need for pesticides will rise because 
farmers must yield more crops on fewer acres and pest-borne 
disease must be controlled.32  Scientists and lawmakers continue to 
work toward pest-control plans that are both environmentally 
sound and economically profitable.33 
B.  The Risks and Regulation of Pesticides 
During the period immediately following World War II, 
pesticides became overused and applicators became careless.34  
Hand in hand with pesticide overuse came increased recognition of 
the potential hazards they pose to human health.35 
“Pesticides are designed to be toxic to living things; so by their 
very nature, they pose risks.”36  The main concern associated with 
pesticide use is the risk it poses to human health.  People can be 
exposed to pesticides in one of three ways: inhalation, absorption 
through the skin, or oral exposure.37  The most typical sources of 
pesticide exposure are food, personal use, drinking water, or work 
exposure.38  Almost all of the foods we eat have been produced with 
the help of pesticides, so we may ingest residue that remains on the 
food.39  Many homeowners use pesticides to control insects or 
weeds, thus coming in contact with them around their own 
homes.40  Some pesticides make their way into our drinking water 
through erosion or drift, causing us to ingest them that way.41  
Finally, pesticide applicators and farm workers are often exposed 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 6. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Morriss & Meiners, supra note 22, at 13. 
 35. See id. at 14-16, 23. 
 36. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 4. 
 37. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Assessing Health Risks from 
Pesticides, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/riskassess.htm (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2006). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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during the course of their jobs.42 
In addition to human health risks, there is also concern about 
the broader environmental impact.43  There is growing concern 
that increased use of pesticides creates pesticide-resistant pests.44  
Resistant pests could lead back to the dangerous cycle of pesticide 
overuse.  There is also evidence that the majority of the pesticides 
applied to crops in the United States do not even reach the 
targeted pests.45  Instead, they affect non-targeted areas or animals 
by way of drift, evaporation, run-off, or erosion.46 
As a result of these concerns, the federal government enacted 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)47 
to address and reduce the adverse effects caused by pesticide 
overuse.48  FIFRA prohibits the sale or distribution of any pesticide 
not registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).49  
The EPA examines all proposed pesticides and will approve 
registration only after a thorough review of their intended 
functions and effects upon the environment.50  States are allowed to 
regulate the sale and use of pesticides so long as they do not permit 
any sale or use prohibited under FIFRA.51  States cannot impose any 
pesticide labeling requirements in addition to or different from 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Tybe A. Brett & Jane E.R. Potter, Risks to Human Health Associated with 
Exposure to Pesticides at the Time of Application and the Role of the Courts, 1 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 355, 365-68 (1990) (discussing the question of whether the benefits associated 
with pesticides currently outweigh the risks). 
 44. Id. at 367. 
 45. Id. at 366. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).  FIFRA was enacted in 1947.  Id. § 135. 
 48. See Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 358-59. 
 49. Id.  Under FIFRA, the EPA must only register a pesticide if the following 
requirements are met: 
(A)  its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it; 
(B)  its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply with 
the requirements of this subchapter; 
(C)  it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment; and 
(D) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized 
practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on 
the environment. 
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5). 
 50. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 359.  FIFRA defines environment as 
“water, air, land, and all plants and man and other living things therein, and the 
interrelationships which exist among these.”  7 U.S.C. § 136(j). 
 51. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 364. 
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those required by FIFRA.52 
During the 1960s, researchers made another attempt to stop 
pesticide overuse, including its effect on non-targeted plants and 
animals and the increasing number of pesticide-resistant pests, by 
developing the integrated pest management (IPM) system.53  IPM 
aimed to use cropping methods that encouraged natural predators 
to attack pests and also to time pesticide applications to coincide 
with the most vulnerable period of a pest’s life.54  IPM was not 
intended as a substitute for pesticides, but only as a supplement to 
improve their effectiveness and reduce their overall use.55 
To further regulate pesticide use, the EPA determined 
“maximum allowable [pesticide] residue levels called ‘tolerances’ 
for thousands of crop and pesticide combinations.”56  A pesticide is 
only permitted for use on food crops if a tolerance level has been 
established.57  The EPA also conducts evaluations to determine 
whether a specific pesticide poses “unreasonable environmental 
risks.”58  It is clear that although real risks exist with pesticide usage, 
researchers and government agencies are working to make sure 
that the risks do not outweigh the benefits. 
C.  Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Pesticides 
Societal changes have made it impossible to return to 
agricultural practices that existed prior to pesticides.  There are 
shortages of farm workers because of urban migration.59  The pay 
rate for laborers has increased, making pesticides more cost-
effective.60  Additionally, most shoppers do not buy fruits or 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 3. 
 54. Id.  IPM involves the use of other techniques for pest management in 
agriculture, including crop rotations, mechanical cultivation, timed plantings, pest 
traps or barriers, and the use of selective herbicides.  John Carlucci, Reforming the 
Law on Pesticides, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 211 (1994). 
 55. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 3. 
 56. Id. at 5. 
 57. Id. at 5-6. 
 58. Id. at 6. 
 59. See LEONARD P. GIANESSI & SUJATHA SANLUKA, NAT’L CTR. FOR FOOD & 
AGRIC. POLICY, THE VALUE OF HERBICIDES IN U.S. CROP PRODUCTION 58 (2003), 
http://www.ncfap.org/reports/Herbicides/FullText.pdf (summarizing studies 
conducted by NCFAP in April 2003 concerning the effect of non-use of pesticides 
on American farms). 
 60. Id. 
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vegetables with blemishes from plant disease or insects.61  Because 
of this, most farmers must use pesticides to remain competitive.62 
Many opponents of pesticide use are also advocates of 
alternative methods, such as organic farming, which relies solely 
upon natural fertilizers and pest control agents.63  Cost increases 
associated with these alternatives, including increased labor for 
hand-weeding and application and income reduction, however, 
make it unlikely that farmers could maintain current crop yields 
without the use of pesticides.64  A 2003 study conducted by the 
National Center for Food and Agriculture Policy (NCFAP) to 
determine the effects of pesticide nonuse showed dramatic declines 
in production and income, while simultaneously showing increases 
in weed control and labor costs.65 
It is probably easiest to see the true benefits of pesticides by 
looking at the risks posed by discontinuing their use.  A ban on 
pesticide use would undoubtedly cause a decrease in food 
production and raise prices, making U.S. farmers less competitive 
in the global market.66  A ban on pesticides would likely create the 
need for an increase in farmed acres to make up for reduced yields 
per acre, thus causing a loss of wildlife habitats.67  In addition, the 
more frequent cultivation of fields for weed control could cause 
erosion leading to soil loss.68  Even our health could be adversely 
affected, because a lower production of fruits and vegetables means 
less consumption of those healthy foods.69 
Another way to view the benefits of pesticides is through 
specific examples.  One such example concerns the decline of the 
native lake trout population in the Great Lakes.70  Sea lampreys, 
which are native to the Atlantic Ocean, began invading the Great 
 
 61. Id. at 3. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 367-68. 
 64. GIANESSI & SANLUKA, supra note 59, at 57. 
 65. NAT’L CTR. FOR FOOD & AGRIC. POLICY, HERBICIDE NONUSE: TOP TEN STATES 
BY IMPACT (2003), http://www.ncfap.org/reports/Herbicides/TopTen.pdf.  The 
NCFAP’s study showed that discontinuing use of pesticides would create a 13.5 
billion pound production loss and $937 million reduced income in Minnesota.  Id.  
In addition, the study showed that nonuse of pesticides would also increase 
Minnesota’s weed control costs by $449 million and labor by 506,000.  Id. 
 66. DELAPLANE, supra note 15, at 3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See GREAT LAKES FISHERIES COMM’N, SEA LAMPREY: A GREAT LAKES INVADER 1 
(2000), http://www.glfc.org/pubs/FACT_3.pdf. 
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Lakes during the mid-1800s.71  Sea lampreys caused the decimation 
of lake trout in the Great Lakes during the 1940s and 1950s.72  
During the 1950s, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) 
discovered that TFM, a pesticide, could effectively control sea 
lampreys while remaining essentially harmless to other lake 
species.73  TFM now has a “40-year track record of success” in 
controlling the lamprey population in the Great Lakes.74  This is 
just one example of a pesticide as an environmentally beneficial 
agent. 
In summary, pesticide use continues because the benefits 
outweigh the risks, especially since the implementation of IPM and 
other strategies that make pesticides effective, yet used less 
extensively. 
III.  THE HISTORY OF HONEY BEES 
A.  Beekeeping in the United States 
Bees are not endemic to North America.75  The first honey 
bees were sent to America in 1623 after a failing apple orchard 
prompted settlers to recall the bees in European orchards and 
request that some be sent over.76  Until the 1800s, beekeeping was 
primitive, although widely recognized as a valuable practice for the 
production of honey and beeswax.77  Although they are normally 
considered ferae naturae,78 because of their economic value courts 
have held since the 1800s that a qualified property interest may be 
acquired in bees if they can be reduced to possession.79 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMM’N, TFM AND SEA LAMPREY CONTROL: A SUCCESS 
STORY 1 (2000), http://www.glfc.org/pubs/FACT_4.pdf. 
 74. Id.  In fact, TFM has reduced the sea lamprey population in the Great 
Lakes by approximately ninety percent.  Id. 
 75. See TAMMY HORN, BEES IN AMERICA: HOW THE HONEY BEE SHAPED A NATION 
24 (2005). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 25-64 (detailing the various types of beekeeping practices that 
existed in early American colonies). 
 78. A ferae naturae is a wild animal. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 653 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 79. M.H.B., Annotation, Law of Bees, 39 A.L.R. 352, 353 (2005).  A qualified 
property interest refers to a temporary interest in a thing that is subject to being 
terminated by the occurrence of an event over which the qualified owner has no 
control.  BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1254. 
9
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In 1851, Lorenzo Langstroth constructed a beehive with 
moveable frames so that beekeepers could remove one frame filled 
with honey and replace it with a new one for bees to build upon.80  
He also imported the Italian bee, which is the variety of honey bee 
most common in the United States today.81  Thus began the 
commercial beekeeping industry. 
Migratory commercial beekeeping82 became possible during 
the 1870s, when previously closed trade routes were reestablished.83  
The commercial beekeeping industry developed right alongside 
the transportation industry.84 
B.  Pollination in Agriculture 
Prior to World War II, bees were used primarily for beeswax 
and honey, but after the war, the federal government began to 
recognize the important role of honey bees as pollinators.85  Just as 
pollination was growing as a business, the prices of honey dropped, 
and beekeepers found that migratory beekeeping was the most 
profitable way to remain in the industry.86 
During the 1970s, Dr. Willard Robinson brought increased 
attention to the value of honey bee pollination through research 
concerning Red Delicious apples.87  Dr. Robinson found that the 
blossom structure on Red Delicious trees actually prevented honey 
bees from pollinating them.88  However, Dr. Robinson discovered 
 
 80. HORN, supra note 75, at 86.   
 81. Id. 
 82. Migratory beekeeping is the practice of moving bees from location to 
location for honey crops and pollination.  BeeCare, Honeybee Encyclopedia, 
http://www.beecare.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) (follow “Encyclopedia” 
hyperlink, then follow “M” hyperlink). 
 83. HORN, supra note 75, at 126-27. 
 84. Id. at 148.  Migratory beekeeping was first made possible via commercial 
train routes.  Id. at 145.  However, with the invention of the automobile, the 
transportation of domesticated honey bees for commercial purposes was made 
even easier.  Id. at 149. 
 85. Id. at 200.  America’s emergence as a major world power and supplier of 
food created the government’s increased recognition of the importance of crop 
pollination by honey bees.  Id.  Pollination is the transfer of pollen from one plant 
to another for fertilization.  American Beekeeping Federation, Honey Bee 
Pollination Crisis: Shortage of Bees May Reduce Crop Production, 
http://abfnet.org/?p=51 (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 86. HORN, supra note 75, at 206. 
 87. See id. at 221-22. 
 88. Id.  This unique blossom structure of Red Delicious apple trees probably 
contributed to the brand not being as productive in the past, even though it had 
been developed in 1872.  Id. 
10
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that farmers could plant crab apples, which are known cross-
pollinators, in the Red Delicious orchards, and then place more 
beehives to ensure adequate pollination of the crab apple trees.89  
His study demonstrated the importance of understanding the 
complex role of pollination in agriculture. 
Today, approximately 1600 beekeepers manage commercial 
colonies in the United States.90  Providing honey bees for crop 
pollination is the easiest and most reliable service in planned 
pollination.91  More than 3.5 million crop acres in the United States 
depend upon honey bee pollination.92  It is estimated that more 
than 100 crops are pollinated by bees, and about one-third of the 
food that Americans eat comes directly from those crops.93  As of 
1997, the estimated value added to United States crops by honey 
bees was $10 billion.94 
C.  Problems for Commercial Beekeepers 
1.  Pesticides 
Beginning with the take-off of migratory beekeeping in the 
1950s, beekeepers were usually the last to know about pesticide 
application schedules and so incurred many losses in their 
colonies.95  Extensive bee kills during the latter 1960s were 
responsible for many commercial beekeepers going out of 
business.96  As of the mid-1990s, bee poisonings from pesticides 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. American Beekeeping Federation, supra note 85.  Commercial 
beekeepers are defined by the American Beekeeping Federation as “those 
beekeepers who manage more than 300 colonies of bees.”  Id. 
 91. MID-ATLANTIC APICULTURAL RESEARCH & EXTENSION CONSORTIUM, 
POLLINATION, PUB. 5.2 (2000), http://maarec.cas.psu.edu/PDFs/Pollination_ 
PM.pdf [hereinafter MAAREC]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. MID-ATLANTIC APICULTURAL RESEARCH & EXTENSION CONSORTIUM, BEES 
ARE BENEFICIAL, PUB. 1.1 (2000), http://maarec.cas.psu.edu/PDFs/Bees_are_ 
Beneficial_-_PM.pdf. 
 94. Dennis Senft, Helping Honey Bees Fight Mites, AGRIC. RES., May 1997, 
available at http://www.beesource.com/news/article/beecells0597.htm.  A variety 
of well-known crops are pollinated by bees, including clover, apples, apricots, kiwi, 
cherries, peaches, almonds, cashews, cotton, sunflower, broccoli, celery, onions, 
beans, and peppers.  This list is far from exhaustive.  MAAREC, supra note 91. 
 95. HORN, supra note 75, at 207.  Because the chemicals had little or no effect 
upon other farmers’ livestock or crops, the beekeepers did not have much 
recourse for the losses they suffered.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 214-15.  In Arizona alone, honey bee populations declined almost 
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resulted in annual losses in crop revenue of $14.3 million.97 
The EPA has designated Carbaryl as “one of the most widely 
applied [pesticides] in the U.S.,”98 which is most likely the reason 
for it being regarded as one of the most dangerous pesticides.99  It 
is highly toxic and has killed more bees in California than any 
other pesticide.100 
2.  Mites 
Pesticides are not the only hindrance to commercial 
beekeepers.  The varroa mite, the most troublesome mite to honey 
bees, first migrated from Asia to the United States in 1987 and 
wiped out thousands of bee colonies.101  The varroa mite is a honey 
bee parasite that infests colonies and can destroy an entire colony 
in a matter of months.102  The American Beekeeping Federation 
estimated that 50% of California bee colonies have been killed or 
severely weakened due to the parasitic varroa mites.103  One 
entomologist estimated that commercial beekeepers nationwide 
have lost about half of their hives as a result of mite infestations.104 
D.  Honey Bees in Minnesota 
Minnesota ranks among the top five states for honey 
production and is currently a base for more than fifty migratory 
beekeepers.105  The Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA) 
 
50% between 1963 and 1977.  Id. at 215. 
 97. North American Pollinator Protection Campaign, Pollinators, 
http://www.nappc.org/pollinator.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 98. Beyond Pesticides, Chemical Watch Factsheet: Carbaryl, 
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/pesticides/factsheets/Carbaryl.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2006).  Carbaryl use began in 1959 and according to the EPA, 
approximately ten to fifteen million pounds are used annually.  Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. HORN, supra note 75, at 228. 
 102. Alfredo Flores, Saving Bees: Fungus Found to Attack Varroa Mites, AGRIC. 
RES., Oct. 2004, available at http://beesource.com/news/article/fungus.htm.  The 
varroa mite reproduces on worker bees and creates year-long hive susceptibility, as 
opposed to only seasonal inflictions.  HORN, supra note 75, at 228.  In the 1980s, 
the mite caused such destruction in the beekeeping industry that many states 
imposed quarantines upon beekeepers.  Id. 
 103. American Beekeeping Federation, supra note 85. 
 104. Senft, supra note 94. 
 105. See MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., APIARY PROGRAM REPORT 1 (2004), 
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/apiary/04apiaryreport.pdf.  Minnesota honey 
production is valued at approximately $12 million annually.  Id. 
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requires all beekeepers to register their colonies.106  MDA records 
show that there are 421 registered Minnesota beekeepers managing 
more than 120,000 colonies.107  Approximately 86% of those 
colonies are kept by migratory beekeepers who make their living in 
the commercial beekeeping industry.108  Colony registration is used 
by the MDA to inspect hives regularly and is available to pesticide 
applicators upon request.109 
The number of pesticide-related complaints from Minnesota 
beekeepers has been steadily increasing since 1996.110  From 1996 
to 2000, the MDA received twelve complaints regarding alleged 
pesticide-related bee kills.111  Only two were found to have sufficient 
evidence to support a pesticide-related bee kill due to negligent 
application by someone other than the beekeepers.112  In 2001, the 
MDA received eight complaints, of which seven were found lacking 
sufficient evidence to conclude death resulting from pesticide 
exposure.113  In 2002, the MDA received ten complaints, of which 
only one was found to have sufficient evidence that a nearby 
pesticide application caused the honey bee deaths.114 
MDA laboratory analysis of beekeeper complaints has yet to 
find widespread detections of Sevin (Carbaryl), which was alleged 
to be the primary pesticide used in most of the complaints reported 
since 2000.115  But in each case, coumaphos, a pesticide used by 
beekeepers to control the varroa mite, was detected in the hives.116  
 
 106. MINN. STAT. § 19.64, subd. 1 (2004).  The law regarding registration 
applies to anyone who “owns, leases, or possesses colonies of bees.”  Id.  The 
maximum annual registration fee is only fifty dollars.  Id. 
 107. See MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 105, at 1. 
 108. See id. The remainder of the colonies are managed either by sideline 
beekeepers, who keep eleven to 799 colonies, or hobbyists, who keep ten or fewer 
colonies.  Id. 
 109. Minnesota Department of Agriculture, Apiary Program, 
http://www.mda.state.mn.us/apiary (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). 
 110. See MINN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., HONEYBEE COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIONS FACT 
SHEET 1 (2003), http://www.mda.state.mn.us/appd/pesticides/ 
beescomplaints.pdf.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  Three of the investigations resulted in financial penalties issued to the 
beekeepers themselves for illegal pesticide use in their own hives.  Id. 
 113. Id.  The remaining investigation determined that an insecticide was the 
likely cause of death of the bees, but could not locate an applicator or an 
appropriate site for the type of insecticide found.  Id. 
 114. Id. at 2.  Again, one complaint was dismissed after the discovery of illegal 
pesticide use by the beekeeper to control honey bee pests.  Id. 
 115. Id. at 1. 
 116. Id. at 2. 
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As a result of these investigations, and with the cooperation of all 
interested parties, the MDA has published a set of “best-
management practices,” which suggests strategies for beekeepers, 
pesticide users, and the MDA in an attempt to address bee 
mortality problems and make future investigations easier.117 
IV.  A LEGAL HISTORY OF PESTICIDE ACTIONS 
A.  Common Law Negligence 
A landowner has an obligation to make reasonable use of his 
or her property so that no unreasonable harm is caused to others 
in the vicinity.118  This “reasonable use” rule is followed in 
Minnesota.119  Through application of this rule, landowners have 
 
 117. Id.  The seven step best-management practices are as follows: 
(1)  Frequent inspection by beekeepers of their colonies to allow timely 
reporting to the MDA of alleged bee kills . . . . 
(2)   Apiarists should minimize their own use of insecticides . . . inside 
hives to control bee pests. . . . 
(3)   Those using insecticides in areas of high apiary concentrations 
should use the least toxic insecticide necessary to control a particular 
pest. 
(4)   Pesticide applicators should determine bee hive locations . . . in the 
vicinity of proposed spray operations prior to making any 
application. . . . 
(5)  Hybrid poplar growers should implement integrated weed control 
strategies to reduce the presence of blooming weeds . . . . 
(6)  The University of Minnesota . . . should research effective 
cottonwood leaf  beetle control strategies that pose minimal risk to 
honeybees and other non-target organisms. 
(7) MDA staff, apiarists and others should periodically review and offer 
proposed improvements to MDA’s inspection protocols and 
procedures related to investigations of reported honeybee problems. 
Id. 
 118. See Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 380 (stating that a landowner’s 
common law privilege is qualified by the rights of neighbors to be safe from 
unreasonable harm on their own land).  See generally 2 C.J.S. Adjoining Landowners 
§ 68 (2005) (stating that a landowner’s privilege to use land is “qualified by due 
regard for others who may be affected by a landowner’s activities on the 
property”).   
 119. See Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907). 
[W]henever a person is placed in such a position with regard to another 
that it is obvious that, if he does not use due care in his own conduct, he 
will cause injury to that person, the duty at once arises to exercise care 
commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds himself, and with 
which he is confronted, to avoid such danger; and a negligent failure to 
perform the duty renders him liable for the consequences of his neglect.  
This principle . . . protects the trespasser from wanton or willful injury. 
14
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not generally been held liable for damage to bees or other 
animals120 caused by pesticides sprayed on their own property.121  In 
Minnesota, a landowner only has a duty to trespassing animals if 
and when they are discovered on the land, and then only to use 
reasonable care to avoid injuring them.122 An animal’s owner is 
entitled to recover for a wrongful injury to an animal resulting 
from a willful act.123 
It is not uncommon for landowners to be held responsible for 
damage caused to property, plants, or animals when pesticides drift 
onto others’ land during or after their application.124  This is a 
regular occurrence in agriculture, sparking many “pesticide drift” 
cases.125 
The most common standard of liability for damage caused to 
neighboring landowners’ animals from pesticide use is 
negligence.126  In order to succeed in a negligence127 claim 
 
Id. 
 120. See discussion supra Part III.A. (noting that bees are comparable to 
domesticated animals once they are reduced to a person’s possession). 
 121. See generally J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Liability for Injury to Trespassing 
Stock from Poisonous Substances on the Premises, 12 A.L.R. 3D 1103 (2005) (discussing 
various cases in which landowners have not been held liable for the poisoning of 
animals who traveled onto their property). 
 122. See Lindemann v. Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Minn. 363, 365, 191 N.W. 
825, 825-26 (1923) (holding that liability pertaining to trespassing animals could 
only be maintained upon a showing of willful or wanton negligence); Witherell v. 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878) (holding that the owner of 
an animal who wanders onto railroad tracks incurs all reasonable risks for the 
animal being injured by a train, but once discovered, the train operator must use 
reasonable care to avoid injuring them). 
 123. See 3B C.J.S. Animals § 426 (2004) (stating that landowners are not liable 
when trespassing animals ingest poison placed on the landowner’s property for 
some other purpose, absent wanton or gross negligence).  Gross negligence is “a 
conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty” which 
leads to consequences suffered by a third party.  BLACK’ S, supra note 78, at 1062. 
 124. See generally Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Liability for Injury Caused by 
Spraying or Dusting of Crops, 37 A.L.R. 3D 833 (2005) (discussing the facts of various 
cases concerning liability of landowners and crop dusters for damages to property 
resulting during pesticide spray applications). 
 125. See, e.g., Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454 (Ariz. 1948); Hammond Ranch 
Corp. v. Dodson, 136 S.W.2d 484 (Ark. 1940); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 
1260 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Ky. Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays, 251 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 
1952); D & W Jones, Inc. v. Collier, 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979); Mustion v. Ealy, 
266 N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1978); McPherson v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1965). 
 126. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 381. 
 127. Negligence is defined as 
[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent 
person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls 
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concerning pesticide use, a plaintiff must prove that the negligent 
application of pesticides on neighboring land was the cause of his 
or her crop or animal damages.128 
A typical case concerning liability for negligence is Miles v. A. 
Arena & Co.129  In Miles, the plaintiff sought damages for the 
destruction of fifty-six beehives allegedly killed by drifting pesticide 
dust from the defendant’s land.130  The plaintiff’s bees were located 
on rented property near the defendant’s farm.131  The Miles court 
relied upon the rule that no landowner has the right to use his 
property in such a way that damage to a neighbor is foreseeable.132  
The court went on to hold that because of the evidence presented 
concerning the conditions at the time of the pesticide spraying, the 
defendants should have foreseen the damage to plaintiff’s bees and 
were liable for damages.133 
California is one jurisdiction that has addressed the unique 
issue of liability for damage to foraging bees, as opposed to bees on 
their own land.  The issue was considered in Lenk v. Spezia,134 in 
which the court held that landowners were not liable to foraging 
bees based upon the decision that the bees were trespassers.135  The 
California District Court of Appeal held that an injured party could 
only recover for damages to bees if the pesticide was sprayed with 
the intention to destroy the bees and not for some other lawful 
 
below the legal standard established [by case law] to protect others 
against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is 
intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others’ rights. 
BLACK’S , supra note 78, at 1061. 
 128. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 381.  A negligence claim must be 
grounded by four elements: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages.  
BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1062. 
 129. 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1937). 
 130. Id. at 1261. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1262.  The Miles court relied upon the Restatement (First) of Torts, 
which states that a land possessor may be held liable for injury caused by an 
artificial condition on his land which creates an “unreasonable risk of bodily harm 
to persons outside the land because of [its] plan, construction, location or 
otherwise.”  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 364 cmt. a (1934). 
 133. Miles, 73 P.2d at 1263.  The conditions referred to by the court were the 
facts that a substance known to be poisonous to bees was being used and at the 
time of the application a breeze was blowing.  Id. 
 134. 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949). 
 135. Id. at 51 (holding that the owner of bees cannot recover for their death 
from poisons procured while trespassing on another’s land “unless the poison was 
distributed wantonly, maliciously, or with the deliberate intent to injure or destroy 
the bees”). 
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purpose.136  This common law negligence decision was based 
primarily upon the generally accepted rule that a landowner is not 
bound to keep the premises safe for others’ trespassing animals.137 
B.  Strict Liability 
A few jurisdictions have found that the application of 
pesticides is an ultrahazardous activity.138  In Loe v. Lenhardt,139 the 
Oregon Supreme Court stated that “[t]he authorities are practically 
uniform in holding that crop dusting is an activity sufficiently 
freighted with danger to impose liability upon the landowner 
having the work done if negligence is proven,” even if there is no 
fault, or if the fault lies entirely with an independent contractor.140 
Courts have recognized liability for pesticide use as an 
ultrahazardous activity for various reasons.  Some cite the 
foreseeability of the pesticide to drift onto neighboring 
properties.141  Others base their classification solely upon the 
intrinsically dangerous characteristics of pesticides.142  Regardless, 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  The Lenk court stated that the defendants had no affirmative duty to 
protect the plaintiff’s trespassing bees from the danger of poison on the land.  Id.  
(citing Jeanes v. Holtz, 211 P.2d 925 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Holt v. Mundell, 
112 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Colo. 1941)); see also Ludington, supra note 121. 
 138. An ultrahazardous (abnormally dangerous) activity is one which 
“necessarily carries with it a significant risk of serious harm even if reasonable care 
is used.”  BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 5.  To determine whether an activity is 
ultrahazardous, one must analyze 
whether there is a high degree of risk of harm, whether any harm caused 
will be substantial, whether the exercise of reasonable care will eliminate 
the risk, whether the activity is a matter of common usage, whether the 
activity is appropriate to the place in which it occurs, and whether the 
activity’s value to society outweighs its dangerousness. 
Id.  (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977)). 
 139. 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961). 
 140. Id. at 315.  The Loe court further discussed the notion that traditional 
practice requires the court, when determining whether an activity is 
ultrahazardous or not, to evaluate and balance the utility of the activity against the 
risk of harm it may cause if miscarried.  Id. at 316. 
 141. See, e.g., Copeland v. Hollingsworth, 535 S.W.2d 815, 816 (Ark. 1976) 
(holding that because of the great probability of pesticide sprays to spread to 
nearby property and cause damage, a landowner could not delegate liability for 
the activity to the independent contractor employed to spray the pesticide). 
 142. See, e.g., Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 262 P.2d 231, 232 (N.M. 1953) (stating 
that the test for liability hinged upon whether danger is inherent in the 
performance of an activity and finding that “depositing an insecticide, consisting 
of a poisonous dust or spray, on a field” is an example of such an inherently 
dangerous activity) (quoting 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant  §§ 590(b), 591(a)). 
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in jurisdictions where strict liability143 applies to pesticide damages, 
courts do not ask whether the defendant acted with due care, but 
only whether the defendant’s actions caused the damage.144 
A classic strict liability application can be seen in Winston v. 
State Department of Highways,145 in which the plaintiff sued to recover 
damages for the deaths of four bulls, allegedly as the result of their 
ingesting arsenic sprayed by the defendant while constructing a 
concrete underpass.146  The Winston court based its ruling upon the 
idea that a person cannot use his land in a way that will cause 
damage to his neighbors.147  The court held that regardless of 
whether or not the defendant used due care in conducting the 
arsenic spraying, it caused the death of the plaintiff’s bulls and he 
should be held strictly liable.148 
C.  Negligence Per Se 
Negligence per se arises not from a common law duty 
stemming from case law decisions, but from a statutory duty.149  In 
other words, the reasonable person standard of care is replaced by 
a statutory standard.150  Because all pesticide applicators are 
required to comply with FIFRA label instructions, many 
jurisdictions find it to be contrary to legislative intent to apply 
common law negligence theories to pesticide cases.151 
Wisconsin is another jurisdiction that has considered the issue 
 
 143. Strict liability “does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, 
but . . . is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe.”  
BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 934.  Ultrahazardous activities form one category of cases 
in which strict liability applies.  Id. 
 144. Brett & Potter, supra note 43, at 392.   
 145. 352 So. 2d 752 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
 146. Id. at 752. 
 147. Id. at 755.  “Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he 
pleases, still he can not [sic] make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor 
of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to 
him.”  Id.  (quoting LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (1977)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1063. 
 150. Elder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1099 (D. Minn. 2004) 
(citing Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn. 1981)). 
 151. See, e.g., Henderson v. Dep’t of Agric., 875 P.2d 487 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); 
Ward v. N.E. Tex. Farmers Coop. Elevator, 909 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App. 1995); 
Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984); see also Robert F. Blomquist, 
Applying Pesticides: Toward Reconceptualizing Liability to Neighbors for Crop, Livestock 
and Personal Damages from Agricultural Chemical Drift, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 393, 394-97 
(1995). 
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of liability for pesticide damage to foraging bees.  In Bennett v. 
Larsen Co.,152 the Wisconsin Supreme Court first decided that it was 
erroneous to classify honey bees as trespassers.153  That decision was 
based upon the idea that a trespass has traditionally been held as 
an uninvited entry.154  Thus, the court found it unreasonable to 
place honey bees in the same category as common trespassers 
because it would be almost impossible to keep bees off one’s 
property if they are intent upon foraging there.155 
The Bennett court then held that, in the absence of willful or 
wanton conduct, land possessors who follow pesticide label 
directions have no duty to foraging bees on their property, because 
they have the right to use their land as they see fit.156  The court 
also expressly noted that the absence of a common law duty to 
honey bees did not preclude duties that may be imposed by 
statutes, which can modify the common law and create negligence 
per se liability.157  Finally, the court held that, in light of a 
Wisconsin statute establishing a standard of care via pesticide label 
instructions, the failure to follow such instructions constituted 
negligence per se.158 
“[B]reach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if the 
persons harmed . . . are within the intended protection of the 
statute and the harm suffered is of the type the legislation was 
intended to prevent.”159  States, like Wisconsin, have usually enacted 
statutes prohibiting the use of pesticides in a manner inconsistent 
with FIFRA labels, which contain warnings such as “[d]o not apply 
while bees are actively foraging.”160  Thus, like in Bennett, most states 
 
 152. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984). 
 153. Id. at 547 n.3. 
 154. Id.  The court reasoned that if there is no way for a landowner to prevent 
a trespasser’s entry, the trespasser status becomes “meaningless insofar as it relates 
to the rights and duties” of the landowner.  Id.  A trespass is a “wrongful entry on 
another’s real property.”  BLACK’S, supra note 78, at  1541. 
 155. Bennett, 348 N.W.2d at 547 n.3. 
 156. Id. at 550. 
 157. Id. at 548-50. 
 158. Id. at 549. 
 159. Alderman’s, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995) (citing Pac. 
Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558-559 (Minn. 1977)).  
Breach of the statute is conclusive evidence of negligence per se because the 
statute imposes a fixed standard of care, as opposed to the reasonable standard 
imposed under ordinary negligence.  Id. 
 160. TRACY E. OUTLAW, CLEMSON UNIV. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, HOW 
TO PROTECT HONEYBEES FROM PESTICIDES 1 (Cam Lay ed., 2006), 
http://dpr.clemson.edu/Acrobat/bulletin-5.pdf. 
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are able to assign liability for pesticide damages based upon the 
theory of negligence per se if the plaintiff can prove that the 
defendant was not following a FIFRA label and had therefore 
violated a state statute. 
V.  THE ANDERSON CASE 
A.  Facts 
Jeffrey Anderson and the other plaintiffs in Anderson v. State 
Department of Natural Resources were migratory commercial 
beekeepers with hives located in several Minnesota counties.161  The 
plaintiffs had permission from several landowners to use the 
landowners’ property for beekeeping in exchange for honey or 
small amounts of money.162  The land upon which the beehives 
were located was adjacent to a poplar tree grove owned and 
managed by the defendants in the case: the State of Minnesota 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and International Paper 
Company (IP).163  The defendants used the property for paper 
production and fuel research.164  Plaintiffs’ honey bees, which 
forage by nature, traveled “a radius of three to five miles, 
pollinating crops and plants in central Minnesota.”165 
In response to a cottonwood leaf beetle infestation in 1997 and 
1998, the defendants retained a commercial spray operator to 
apply the pesticide Sevin® XLR Plus (Sevin) to their poplar 
groves.166  Sevin, which is one of the most commonly used pesticides 
in the United States,167 is also highly toxic to bees.168 
 
 161. 693 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 2005). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 674 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005). 
 166. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185. 
 167. BEYOND PESTICIDES, CHEMICAL WATCH FACTSHEET: CARBARYL 1 (2001), 
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/pesticides/factsheets/Carbaryl.pdf.  Sevin is the 
brand name for the generic Carbaryl.  Id. 
 168. Id. at 2; see also Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 752 (stating that foraging bees 
can carry poisoned pollen back to the hive, where it can stay active for up to a 
year); Letter from Shawnee Hoover, Special Projects Director, Beyond Pesticides, 
to the Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pesticide Programs (Nov. 16, 
2004), available at http://www.beyondpesticides.org/watchdog/comments/ 
Carbaryl%20beyond%20pesticides%2012_04.pdf (containing a compilation of 
comments from U.S. beekeepers, beekeeping associations, public interest groups, 
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Sevin’s label explicitly instructs users not to apply the pesticide 
if bees are foraging in the area.169  The beekeepers alleged that the 
DNR and IP knew of foraging bees on their property when they 
directed the pesticide spraying.170  During one occasion in 1999, 
referred to by the parties as the “Swanson incident,” one of the 
landowners estimated that Sevin was sprayed approximately 100 
feet from several of the beekeepers’ hives.171  The Minnesota 
Department of Agriculture (MDA) lab confirmed that at least some 
of the bees found after the “Swanson incident” had died as a result 
of Sevin poisoning.172  The DNR now has a policy, which was 
implemented in 2001, not to use Sevin on any of its groves without 
first notifying registered beekeepers.173 
B.  Procedure 
1.  The Douglas County District Court 
The beekeepers brought suit against the DNR and IP, alleging 
three causes of action.  First, they asserted that the defendants 
negligently created an unreasonable risk of harm to their bees.174 
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants were negligent 
per se by using pesticides in a manner inconsistent with a label as 
 
and academic supporters to the Environmental Protection Agency concerning the 
bee caution contained on Carbaryl pesticides). 
 169. BAYER CROPSCIENCE, SEVIN® BRAND XLR PLUS CARBARYL INSECTICIDE 2 
(2004), available at http://bayercropscienceus.com (follow “Labels/MSDS” 
hyperlink; then follow “Specimen Label (Section 3)” hyperlink under “Sevin® XLR 
Plus” heading). The bee caution on Sevin’s label reads: 
This product is highly toxic to bees exposed to direct treatment or 
residues on blooming crops or weeds.  However, field studies have shown 
that SEVIN® brand . . . is less hazardous to honey bees than other 
carbaryl products when direct application to bees is avoided and the 
spray residues have dried.  For maximum honey bee hazard reduction, 
apply from late evening to early morning or when bees are not foraging.  
Do not apply this product or allow it to drift to blooming crops or weeds if bees are 
foraging in the treatment area.  However, applications may be made during 
foraging periods if the beekeeper takes . . . precautionary measures prior 
to bee flight activity on the day of treatment . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 170. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 752. 
 174. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185. 
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defined in the Minnesota Pesticide Control Act (MPCA).175  Finally, 
the beekeepers alleged that the DNR and IP had created a private 
nuisance.176  The DNR and IP filed motions for summary judgment 
on all claims.177  The district court granted summary judgment for 
the DNR and IP on all claims with the exception of a portion of the 
negligence claim related to the “Swanson incident,” which had 
been confirmed by the MDA lab and held by the court to be 
indicative of intentional and wanton conduct.178 
2.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the denial of 
summary judgment for the negligence claims relating to the 
“Swanson incident.”179  The court held that because the DNR had 
hired an independent contractor to spray near the hives in the 
“Swanson incident,” the DNR could not be held vicariously liable 
for any resulting injury to the bees.180  The court discussed the fact 
that other states had found pesticide spraying to be so dangerous 
that landowners who hire independent contractors to do the 
spraying could not avoid liability.181  However, because the parties 
did not present evidence regarding whether or not spraying 
pesticides constitutes an ultrahazardous activity,182 the court 
declined to change the general rule183 that—absent an 
ultrahazardous activity—an employer is not liable for harm caused 
by an act of a general contractor.184 
 
 175. Id.  The Minnesota Pesticide Control Act is codified at Minnesota Statutes 
section 18B.07. 
 176. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185. 
 177. Id. at 185-86. 
 178. Id. at 186. 
 179. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 674 N.W.2d 748, 759 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. The general rule is that a party is not entitled to raise a question for the 
first time on appeal.  See Edelstein v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 225 
Minn. 508, 516, 31 N.W.2d 465, 470 (1948) (stating that the theory upon which a 
case is tried must be adhered to on appeal); see also Morton v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 301 
Minn. 405, 427, 223 N.W.2d 764, 771 (1974); Duenow v. Lindeman, 223 Minn. 
505, 510, 27 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1947). 
 183. In Minnesota, the employer of a contractor is not liable for harm caused 
by an act or omission made by the contractor.  Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313 
N.W.2d 397, 403 (Minn. 1981) (citing Rausch v. Julius B. Nelson & Sons, Inc., 276 
Minn. 12, 149 N.W.2d 1 (1967)). 
 184. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 759.  The court acknowledged that Minnesota 
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The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the nuisance 
claim because the plaintiffs failed to “demonstrate an injury 
stemming from an interest in land.”185  The court held that no 
nuisance claim exists if a party cannot show an injury to land,186 and 
that bees could not be considered land.187 
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
of the other negligence claims, in which the plaintiffs alleged that 
the DNR and IP had a duty to use pesticides in a way that did not 
create an unreasonable risk of harm to their bees.188  In doing so, 
the court relied upon the conclusions of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in Bennett v. Larsen Co.,189 because it was one of only two 
jurisdictions in the United States to address what type of duty 
landowners owe to bees foraging on their property.190  The court of 
appeals found that bees were not trespassers in the traditional 
sense, but that landowners nevertheless had a duty not to 
intentionally harm bees if they were on their property.191  However, 
the defendants were not held liable for negligence because there 
was no evidence of intentional or wanton conduct on their part.192 
Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence per se claim, which alleged 
that the DNR and IP applied the pesticide inconsistent with the bee 
caution on Sevin’s label.193  The court of appeals deferred to the 
expert testimony of a MDA director, who stated that Sevin’s bee 
caution should be interpreted to mean that the pesticide should 
not be applied when “a significant number of blooming crops or 
 
courts have not yet addressed whether the Second Restatement of Torts’ 
ultrahazardous activity exception applies to an independent contractor spraying 
pesticides but have ruled that if the spraying were determined to be 
ultrahazardous, then an employer would be held vicariously liable for any damage 
caused by it under the non-delegable duty rule.  Id. (citing Kellen v. Mathias, 519 
N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 185. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 760. 
 186. Id. (quoting Am. Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 
763 F. Supp. 1473, 1494 (D. Minn. 1991)). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 758. 
 189. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984). 
 190. Anderson, 674 N.W.2d at 757. 
 191. Id. at 757-58. 
 192. Id. at 758.  The court of appeals found that neither IP nor the DNR 
intentionally meant to harm the bees because their sole purpose in spraying the 
pesticides was to stop the beetle infestation in their poplar groves and not to rid 
their land of honey bees.  Id. 
 193. Id. at 753. 
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weeds are present . . . [and] a significant number of bees are actively 
foraging in the treatment area.”194  The court held that the 
beekeepers had not proven that a significant number of bees were 
actively foraging in the poplar groves during the pesticide 
application, so Sevin’s label was not violated.195 
3.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a four-to-two decision,196 
affirmed the dismissal of the private nuisance claim based upon the 
fact that “[p]rivate nuisance is limited to real property interests.”197  
However, the court held that summary judgment against the 
beekeepers on the negligence and negligence per se claims was 
improper.198 
The supreme court first concluded that land possessors who 
have knowledge of foraging honey bees on their property have a 
duty of reasonable care not to harm the bees.199  The court 
reasoned that such a duty stems from the general duty of 
landowners not to use their property in a way that would cause 
injury to another’s property.200  The court acknowledged that 
liability had regularly been imposed upon landowners who sprayed 
pesticide that then drifted onto another’s property and killed 
bees,201 but that it had not yet been imposed in cases involving bees 
coming in contact with pesticides while foraging on another’s 
property.202  However, the court reasoned that it has long been held 
that once a trespassing animal is discovered upon the property, a 
landowner is “bound to use reasonable care to avoid injuring 
[it].”203 
 
 194. Id. at 754. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Justice G. Barry Anderson took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this case. 
 197. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Minn. 
2005). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 189 n.4. 
 200. Id. at 186 (citing Farrell v. Minneapolis & R.R. Ry. Co., 121 Minn. 357, 
361, 141 N.W. 491, 492 (1913)). 
 201. Id. at 187 (citing Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454, 459 (Ariz. 1948); 
McKennon v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Ark. 1951); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 
P.2d 1260, 1263 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937)). 
 202. Id. (citing Lenk v. Spezia, 213 P.2d 47, 51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949); 
Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 547-48 n.3 (Wis. 1984)). 
 203. Id. (quoting Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 
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The supreme court next decided that it was unnecessary to 
classify the honey bees’ entry onto the defendants’ land because 
the resulting duty of reasonable care was the same regardless of 
whether or not the bees were deemed trespassers.204  In addition, 
the court had difficulty identifying honey bees as classic 
trespassers205 because they forage in order to pollinate crops and 
their entry results in a benefit to the landowner.206  The court 
therefore found that because bees and honey are important aspects 
of agriculture, it would be against public policy to classify them as 
trespassers.207 
The supreme court also declined to place a duty upon land 
possessors to investigate their land for honey bees prior to using 
pesticides.208  Although Minnesota requires beekeepers to register 
annually so that pesticide applicators can easily locate nearby 
apiaries,209 the court found that it is more practical for beekeepers 
themselves to provide notice to those that own land where the bees 
may forage.210 
The supreme court acknowledged the extensive efforts of the 
legislature to address the damaging effects of pesticides through 
FIFRA and its preemptive effect upon state negligence claims.211  
However, because FIFRA only preempts claims based upon breach 
of warranty, failure to warn, or the EPA’s enforcement of label 
requirements, the court found that the beekeepers still had a 
common law negligence claim against the DNR and IP.212 
 
(1878)). 
 204. Id.  The court held that if the beekeepers’ allegation that the DNR and IP 
knew about the foraging bees was correct, trespasser classification was unnecessary 
because even if the bees were trespassing, the landowner still has a duty of 
reasonable care once they are discovered on the land.  Id. 
 205. A trespasser is “one who intentionally and without consent or privilege 
enters another’s property.” BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1543. 
 206. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 n.2. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 187 n.3. 
 209. MINN. STAT. § 19.64, subd. 1 (2004).  “Every person who owns, leases, or 
possesses colonies of bees shall register the bees with the commissioner[;] . . . 
[t]he registration application shall include . . . a description of the exact location 
of each of the applicant’s apiaries by county, township, range, and quarter section 
. . . .”  Id. 
 210. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 n.3. 
 211. Id. at 188.  The preemptive effect of FIFRA is that “[a] State may regulate 
the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide . . . in the State, but only if and 
to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this 
subchapter.”  7 U.S.C. § 136v (2000). 
 212. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 188. 
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The supreme court next considered whether the plaintiffs had 
presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendants 
had knowledge of the honey bees on their property.213  Primarily 
based upon documents presented by the beekeepers from a 2000 
meeting where IP and the DNR were informed of the bees’ 
presence and the negative impact of Sevin, the court held that 
summary judgment against the plaintiffs was improper.214  The 
court also determined that the plaintiffs should be allowed to 
continue with their negligence claim based upon the “Swanson 
incident” because the DNR had retained control over the 
contractor doing the spraying and thus could be found negligent 
for that incident as well.215 
Finally, the supreme court reviewed the negligence per se 
claim in relation to a violation of Sevin’s label.216  The statutory 
violation alleged by the plaintiffs was the MPCA,217 which prohibits 
the use of pesticides in a manner that is “inconsistent with a label 
or labeling as defined by FIFRA.”218  Unlike the court of appeals, 
the supreme court concluded that the MDA expert’s testimony was 
not entitled to deference because the expert was not an agency 
decision-maker and was obtained solely for the purpose of 
litigation.219  In addition, the court found that conflicting expert 
testimony on behalf of both parties created genuine issues of 
material fact, thus precluding summary judgment against the 
beekeepers.220 
4.  The Minnesota Supreme Court Dissent 
Justice Meyer, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Blatz, argued 
that the majority was “plowing new ground in tort law by 
recognizing a common law duty owed to foraging bees.”221  The 
dissent disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that landowners 
 
 213. Id. at 188-89. 
 214. Id. at 189. 
 215. Id. (citing Conover v. N. States Power, 313 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1981)).  
The Conover court determined that an exception to the general rule that an owner 
is not liable for a contractor’s actions exists if the owner retains detailed control 
over a project and then fails to carefully supervise the contractor.  Conover, 313 
N.W.2d at 403. 
 216. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 189-90. 
 217. MINN. STAT. § 18B.07 (2004). 
 218. Id. § 18B.07, subd. 2(a)(1). 
 219. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 191. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
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have a duty to use their land in a way that does not injure the 
property of others.222  The dissent suggested that the proper duty of 
landowners is correctly stated as being a “duty not to create ‘a 
serious interference with [neighbors’] use and enjoyment of land 
by pollution or the like.’”223 
The dissent favored the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bennett v. Larsen, Co.,224 which states that landowners owe no duty 
to foraging bees on their property other than to avoid intentionally 
or wantonly destroying the bees.225  The dissent criticized the 
majority’s reasoning that a common law duty exists based upon the 
legislature’s enactment of protective statutes regarding pesticides 
because it did not make sense for a common law duty to “spring[] 
from a duty arising from state or federal regulation.”226 
Because a negligence per se claim arises from a statutory 
violation as opposed to a common law violation, the dissent felt 
that a remedy stemming from negligence per se was the more 
appropriate route for the beekeepers.227  Justice Meyer questioned 
the ability of a jury to determine whether or not pesticide spraying 
created an unreasonable risk without consulting a pesticide’s label 
requirements.228  Because the majority had concluded that the 
beekeepers could sustain a claim for negligence per se, the dissent 
concluded that it was unnecessary to allow a claim under ordinary 
common law negligence.229 
VI.  ANALYSIS OF THE ANDERSON DECISION 
A.  Honey Bees as Trespassers 
Courts considering the issue of a pesticide user’s duty to 
foraging bees often seem to have trouble with the classification of 
bees as trespassers.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in 
Bennett that it is the “uninvited entry onto the property” which 
 
 222. Id. at 192. 
 223. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 231 (2000)). 
 224. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984). 
 225. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bennett, 348 
N.W.2d at 547 n.3). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
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creates a trespass, and bees are not necessarily uninvited.230  
Similarly in Anderson, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to 
classify bees as trespassers because it would be “problematic to 
characterize bees as unwelcome on land where trees and other 
vegetation are grown for commercial purposes” due to their 
beneficial effect upon such land.231 
A trespasser is defined as one who “intentionally and without 
consent or privilege enters another’s property.”232  The question 
that arises upon analysis of the Anderson decision is whether honey 
bees should fail to qualify as trespassers because they may provide a 
benefit to the land upon which they forage. 
Defining bees as trespassers is irreconcilable with the notion 
that if one provides a benefit to the landowner, the person 
providing the benefit cannot be classified as a trespasser.  However, 
the title of trespasser applies both to the “wicked and the 
innocent.”233  It would indeed be problematic to define honey bees 
as wicked per se given the benefits that they provide in 
agriculture.234  But Anderson must be distinguished from situations 
in which a landowner has expressly consented or hired a 
commercial beekeeper to provide bees for pollination.  Simply 
because honey bees may benefit owners of adjoining land does not 
mean they are immune from the theory of trespass.235  In Anderson, 
the honey bees were neither solicited nor invited onto the DNR or 
IP property, and thus must be trespassers. 
In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court inadvertently classified 
the honey bees as trespassers because it applied the traditional rule 
relevant to trespassing livestock in Minnesota.236  The Anderson 
court declined to use the actual definition but still went on to base 
its decision on the landowner’s duty of reasonable care “once he 
 
 230. Bennett, 348 N.W.2d at 547. 
 231. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 n.2. 
 232. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 1543. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B. regarding the various benefits conferred 
upon the agricultural industry by honey bees. 
 235. The intent or motive behind an action is immaterial to a trespass claim.  
87 C.J.S. Trespass § 6 (2005); see also Cover v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 454 S.W.2d 
507, 512 (Mo. 1970) (holding that an act may be done in good faith or with 
honest intentions but still create liability for trespass in the actor); Brannon v. Gulf 
States Energy Corp., 562 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. 1977) (stating that one can be a 
trespasser in good faith). 
 236. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 (citing Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 
Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878)). 
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knows . . . the trespasser’s presence.”237  This reasoning will 
undoubtedly create confusion in tort cases based upon trespassing 
theory, much like the confusion the Minnesota Supreme Court 
hoped to quash when abolishing the distinction between licensees 
and invitees.238 
B.  Common Law Negligence 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision provides landowners 
using pesticides with a common law duty of reasonable care to 
foraging bees that they know are on their property.239  The Anderson 
court’s conclusion was based upon a landowner’s general duty not 
to use land in a way that injures another’s property.240  This is the 
same reasonable use rule that has usually been applied in making 
the determination that landowners are not liable for damage to bees 
or other animals caused by pesticides sprayed on their own 
property.241  The Anderson court applied the reasonable use rule in 
a way that is inconsistent with its previous application and 
understanding by courts in other jurisdictions.242  The question 
remains as to whether this is a logical interpretation of the general 
rule for the unique situation presented by foraging bees. 
In its decision, the Anderson court cited the traditional 
Minnesota rule that landowners have a limited duty to trespassing 
livestock.243  Under that rule, Minnesota landowners can only be 
 
 237. Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 593 (2000)) (emphasis 
added). 
 238. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972).  
Prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Peterson, liability towards 
entrants on one’s land was determined according to whether the law regarded the 
entrant as a licensee or an invitee.  Id., 199 N.W.2d at 642.  Because of the 
confusion this created in the courts and for landowners, the court decided the 
distinction should be abolished.  Id. at 171, 199 N.W.2d at 646. 
 239. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 188-89. 
 240. Id. at 186. 
 241. See Ludington, supra note 121 (summarizing several cases from various 
jurisdictions where a landowner was sued for the injury or death of livestock 
caused by ingesting a poisonous substance while trespassing and was held as not 
liable per the general rule that landowners are not bound to keep the premises 
safe for trespassing animals of others). 
 242. See, e.g., Beinhorn v. Griswold, 69 P. 557 (Mont. 1902) (holding that a 
mine operator had no affirmative duty to protect a neighboring landowner’s cattle 
from ingesting poison while on his land); Tenn. Chem. Co. v. Henry, 85 S.W. 401 
(Tenn. 1905) (holding that a landowner had no obligation to keep his premises 
safe for trespassing animals). 
 243. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187 (citing Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 
Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878)). 
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held liable for injuries to trespassing animals if they are proven to 
be grossly negligent in their actions towards the animals.244  Willful 
negligence is proven by showing that after discovering the 
trespassing animals, the landowner acted intentionally in such a 
way as to injure them.245 
Because the Anderson court cites the above rules in its 
reasoning, the court’s conclusion is not plausible.  If the DNR and 
IP had placed a poisonous substance on their land with the intent 
to kill the honey bees foraging there, they could certainly be liable 
for negligence under the Minnesota rule.  However, they did not 
have that intent.  Instead, they sprayed pesticide on their land 
solely in an effort to rid it of damaging pests.246 
For a plaintiff to succeed in a negligence claim, there must 
also be proof that the negligent application of pesticides caused the 
damage to animals or crops.247  In Anderson, the plaintiffs offered 
proof of causation for only the “Swanson incident.”248  Thus, the 
plaintiffs’ claims failed to satisfy the breach of duty and causation 
requirements necessary to hold pesticide users liable under the 
traditional reasonable use rule as applied in Minnesota.249 
There is a reason that the reasonable use rule has generally 
been found to place liability upon pesticide users only in pesticide 
drift cases.  In those cases, it is easy to contemplate ways in which 
reasonable landowners would act in order to avoid injuries to those 
on neighboring land.  For example, a reasonable landowner would 
probably not spray pesticide when there is a strong wind blowing 
towards the neighboring property.250  However, in the unique 
situation presented by foraging bees on the landowner’s property, 
the rule is difficult to apply.  This is at least partially due to the fact 
 
 244. Lindemann v. Chi., R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Minn. 363, 365, 191 N.W. 825, 
825-26 (1923). 
 245. See id., 191 N.W. at 825-26 (stating that men who were operating a train 
and saw trespassing animals on the tracks with time to avoid them could be liable 
based upon willful negligence for failing to avoid the animals). 
 246. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185.  The DNR and IP retained the pesticide 
sprayer solely to combat a cottonwood leaf beetle infestation.  Id. 
 247. See discussion infra Part IV.A (describing the essential elements of a 
negligence claim). 
 248. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 185.  See infra Part V.A for information related to 
the “Swanson incident” and the MDA’s confirmation that Sevin caused the deaths 
of the honey bees in that one incident. 
 249. See Witherell v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 24 Minn. 410, 414 (1878). 
 250. See Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1937) (holding that 
damage to neighboring property was foreseeable because a wind was blowing at 
the time of the pesticide application). 
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that there is no reasonable way for a landowner to prevent bees 
from entering the land to forage for nectar, at least not for more 
than short periods of time.251 
C.  Negligence Per Se 
The Anderson court, in making the determination that the 
DNR and IP could be held liable for common law negligence, 
relied heavily upon legislative efforts to address pesticide hazards 
through FIFRA labeling requirements.252  However, common law 
actions in negligence stem from judicial decisions rather than 
legislative efforts.253  The violation of a statute that was created to 
standardize pesticide usage through label regulations falls within 
the principles of negligence per se, not common law negligence.254 
Negligence per se is often easier to establish because the 
reasonable person standard of care is replaced by a fixed statutory 
standard.255  Minnesota enacted the MPCA to prohibit the use of 
pesticides in a manner that is inconsistent with FIFRA labels.256  The 
MPCA has thus created a statutory standard of care for pesticide 
users in Minnesota by prescribing the way in which they are to use 
pesticides, which is, in turn, regulated by federal statute under 
FIFRA.  The label on Sevin has a lengthy caution relating to the 
pesticide’s use near bee colonies.257  Use of the pesticide in a 
manner inconsistent with that bee caution constitutes a violation of 
the MPCA and creates a cause of action for negligence per se. 
The Anderson court acknowledged the statutory standard of 
care as a substitute for the reasonable person standard but failed to 
explain why both causes of action should be upheld in this 
situation.258  The court made a point to recognize the legislative 
intent behind FIFRA regulations when determining if a common 
 
 251. See Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540, 547 n.2 (Wis. 1984). 
 252. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 188. 
 253. BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 293. 
 254. Id. at 1063; see also Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 193, 76 N.W.2d 660, 
665 (1956) (holding that when the standard of conduct is prescribed by a statute, 
that standard is a “legislative substitute for the common-law standard of a 
reasonably prudent man”). 
 255. Elder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1099 (D. Minn. 2004). 
 256. MINN. STAT. § 18B.07, subd. 2(a)(1) (2004). 
 257. Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 674 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,  693 N.W.2d 181. 
 258. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 189-90. 
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law duty of negligence was applicable;259 however, it failed to make 
mention of such intent in the realm of negligence per se.  Because 
the Sevin label prescribes specific cautions regarding its use with 
regard to honey bees, the resulting statutory standard of care 
should supplant the reasonable person standard of care in order to 
avoid confusion.  If it does not, an applicator will not likely be able 
to determine which standard he is expected to follow.260 
D.  Public Policy 
The Anderson court based much of its reasoning for the 
creation of a common law duty to foraging bees on the policy of 
protecting honey-producing operations as an important aspect of 
agriculture.261  The court stated that to hold that the DNR and IP 
did not have a common law duty of reasonable care would be to 
“carve out an exception of liability for damage to honey-producing 
operations.”262  However, is it not unfairly prejudicial to other 
agricultural operations to allow commercial beekeepers to bring 
both claims of negligence and negligence per se when negligence 
per se alone would suffice?  The court did not balance its decision 
with the similar importance of using pesticides to increase and 
improve crop production.263 
E.  Implications to Pesticide Users and Beekeepers 
The primary implication of the Anderson decision is that it sets 
a binding precedent in Minnesota.264  Future litigation regarding a 
landowner’s duty to foraging bees on his own property will be 
determined according to the reasoning set forth in Anderson.265  In 
 
 259. Id. at 188. 
 260. See id. at 193 (Meyer, J., dissenting).  The dissenting opinion in Anderson 
presents a similar argument questioning how a jury would be able to determine 
what type of pesticide use constitutes a violation of the reasonable person standard 
without consulting the pesticide’s label requirements.  Id. 
 261. Id. at 189-90. 
 262. Id. at 189 n.4.  The court argued that “in referencing policy in support of 
our determination [that the DNR and IP had a duty of reasonable care to the 
foraging bees on their property], we are not recognizing a new common-law duty.”  
Id. 
 263. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 264. The doctrine of stare decisis requires Minnesota courts to adhere to 
former decisions in order to provide more stability in the law.  Oanes v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000) (citing Naftalin v. King, 257 Minn. 
498, 509, 102 N.W.2d 301, 308 (1960)). 
 265. Under the theory of binding precedent, a lower court is obligated to 
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addition, although they are not required to follow the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision, courts in other jurisdictions will likely 
evaluate Anderson in applicable cases as persuasive precedent.266  
Anderson is particularly relevant to other jurisdictions because it is 
one of only three decisions on the issue of liability to foraging bees 
and is the most recent decision.267 
The Anderson precedent is troubling, considering the efforts 
that have been put forth by the MDA and the EPA to address 
pesticide hazards.268  It essentially renders the MPCA and FIFRA 
label requirements void because, if an applicator is required to 
follow a reasonable person standard, there is no need for 
cautionary labels.269  Even the lead plaintiff in this case, Jeffrey 
Anderson, did not feel that it was necessary for tort law to interfere 
if the State would properly administer FIFRA regulations.270 
It is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s duty to determine 
whether or not the lower court correctly applied the law.271  The 
common law to be applied here was that a landowner has a duty 
only to avoid intentionally or wantonly harming honey bees 
foraging on the property.272  The statutory law to be applied is for 
 
follow an applicable decision made by a higher court in its jurisdiction.  BLACK’S, 
supra note 78, at 1215. 
 266. Persuasive precedent is not binding on a court, but is usually entitled to 
“respect and careful consideration” in similar cases.  BLACK’S, supra note 78, at 
1215. 
 267. Only California and Wisconsin have considered the exact situation 
presented by Anderson.  See Lenk v. Spezia, 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); 
Bennett v. Larsen Co., 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984). 
 268. See supra Parts II.B, III.D. 
 269. See Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 693 N.W.2d 181, 188-89 
(Minn. 2005) (holding that an applicator can be held to the reasonable person 
standard under a claim for negligence). 
 270. Pesticide.Net, Applicators and Property Owners Liable if Pesticide Use Kills 
Foraging Honey Bees, Court Rules,  INSIDER EJOURNAL, Mar. 15, 2005, 
http://www.pestlaw.com/insider/articles/200503150205/05-BeeSuit.htm.  Jeffrey 
Anderson responded to the case with the following: 
I feel we shouldn’t need tort law to protect us because we already have a 
statute, FIFRA, if only the states would enforce it. The precautionary bee 
statements lay it all out.  If there are honey bees foraging you shouldn’t 
be spraying, and, as long as everybody plays by that rule, we’re okay. 
Id. 
 271. MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03; see also State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 
(Minn. 1990) (stating that on appeal, it is the court’s duty to determine whether 
there are issues of material fact and whether the lower courts erred in their 
application of the law). 
 272. See, e.g., Lenk, 213 P.2d 47; Bennett, 348 N.W.2d 540; see also 3B C.J.S. 
Animals § 426 (2004). 
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the DNR and IP to apply the pesticides according to the Sevin 
label.273  It is not appropriate for the court to create a standard of 
care that may be inconsistent with the standard prescribed by the 
legislature. 
How easy will it be for beekeepers to recover damages?  They 
must be able to prove that the landowner had actual or 
constructive knowledge of foraging bees on the property.274  The 
Anderson court held that state apiary registration is not enough to 
put pesticide users on notice.275  The beekeepers must then prove 
that pesticide was carelessly sprayed and that the bees died as a 
result of the pesticide.276  This could also be difficult given the track 
record of previous MDA complaints.277  It would be easier to apply 
the standard set forth by FIFRA and the MPCA rather than trying 
to determine the reasonable person standard. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
A negligence per se action in the Anderson case would have 
sufficed to bring all the parties’ issues to light and allow the lower 
court to rule properly without the discrepancies between standards.  
The supreme court’s decision will create confusion among 
pesticide users and anyone encountering the trespass doctrine 
under tort law.  The real problem stems from the improper 
administration of policies set forth in FIFRA to specifically protect 
parties such as the plaintiffs in Anderson.  By ruling that a common 
law action in negligence exists, the supreme court has reiterated 
the notion that the statutory duties are not being properly 
enforced.  Ignoring the intent of the legislature to balance the 
interests of beekeepers and pesticide users in agriculture through 
FIFRA, the supreme court has set the scales in favor of one party’s 
contributions to agriculture.  By allowing a beekeeper to maintain a 
common law action for negligence, the Minnesota Supreme Court 




 273. See MINN. STAT. § 18B.07 (2004). 
 274. Anderson, 693 N.W.2d at 187. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 277. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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